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Context-Aware Access Control for RDF Graph Stores
Luca Costabello and Serena Villata and Fabien Gandon 1
Abstract. We present SHI3LD, an access control framework for
RDF stores. Our solution supports access from mobile devices
with context-aware policies and is exclusively grounded on stan-
dard Semantic Web languages. Designed as a pluggable filter for
generic SPARQL endpoints, the module uses RDF named graphs and
SPARQL to protect triples. Evaluation shows faster execution time
for low-selective queries and less impact on larger datastores.
1 Introduction
The Web is evolving from an information space for sharing textual
documents into a medium for publishing structured data. The Linked
Data2 initiative aims at fostering the publication and interlink of data
on the Web, giving birth to the Web of Data, an interconnected global
dataspace where data providers publish their content publicly [13].
The open nature of current Web of Data information and the con-
sumption of web resources from mobile devices may give providers
the impression that their content is not safe, thus preventing further
publication of datasets, at the expense of the growth of the Web of
Data itself. Access control is therefore necessary, and mobile context
must be part of the access control evaluation.
In this paper we address the problem of defining an access control
framework, called SHI3LD3, for querying Web of Data servers from
mobile environments. Three major challenges arise: (i) definition of
a fine-grained access control model for graph stores, (ii) modelling
of context-aware, mobile consumption of such information, and (iii)
integration of mobile context in the access control model.
We protect RDF stores by changing the semantics of the incoming
SPARQL queries, whose scope is restricted to triples included in ac-
cessible named graphs only. We determine the list of accessible graphs
by evaluating pre-defined access policies against the actual mobile
context of the requester. Beyond the support for context in control
enforcement, our proposal has the advantage of being a pluggable
filter for generic SPARQL endpoints, with no need to modify the
endpoint itself. We adopt exclusively Semantic Web languages and
reuse existing proposals, thus we do not add new policy definition
languages, parsers nor validation procedures. We provide protection
up to triple level. Our work does not provide yet another context
ontology: our model includes base classes and properties only, as
we delegate refinements and extensions to domain specialists, in the
light of the Web of Data philosophy [13]. We do not deal with mobile
context fetch, thus including on-board sensors or server-side inference.
For the time being, our framework assumes the trustworthiness of the
information sent by the mobile consumer, including data describing
context (e.g. location, device features, etc). We do not provide any
privacy-preserving mechanism yet, although aware that sensible data
1 INRIA Sophia Antipolis, France, email: firstname.lastname@inria.fr
2 http://linkeddata.org
3 http://wimmics.inria.fr/projects/shi3ld/
such as current location must be handled appropriately. Our approach
focuses only on SPARQL data servers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 com-
pares the related work to SHI3LD. Section 3 introduces the context
aspects and the access control model. The control enforcement al-
gorithm is detailed in Section 4. Section 5 shows the experimental
results.
2 Related Work
We differ from WAC4 since we go beyond RDF document granularity
and we do not rely on access control lists. Sacco and Passant [17]
present the PPO vocabulary. The common points of PPO and SHI3LD
are the use of the ASK queries for representing the access conditions
and the use of Semantic Web languages only. Sacco and Passant ex-
press access control policies for RDF documents, while we provide an
authorization mechanism for RDF stores. Moreover, our framework
adopts context-aware policies while in [17] context is not consid-
ered. Finally, we provide an evaluation of the experimental results
of SHI3LD, differently from [17] where no evaluation is addressed.
Flouris et al. [11] provide a fine-grained access control framework
on top of RDF repositories coupled with a high level specification
language. Finin et al. [10] consider attribute-based access control
where, similarly to our proposal, the constraints are based on general
attributes of an action. Giunchiglia et al. [12] propose a Relation
Based Access Control model, while we specify the attributes the con-
sumer must satisfy. Context information is supported to some extent
by Abel et al. [1]. They provide triple-level access control as a layer
on top of RDF stores. Contextual conditions are pre-evaluated before
expanding the queries. They introduce a high-level syntax for policy
definition, while we exclusively rely on RDF. Toninelli et al. [18]
adopt context-awareness and semantic technologies for access control
but they do not apply their solution to the Web of Data. The semantic
technology adopted differs, i.e., rule-based approach with description
logic in their case and SPARQL 1.1 in our proposal. Their contex-
tual information does not include the device dimension. Covington et
al. [7] use the notion of role proposed by Role Based Access Control
to capture the context of the environment in which the access requests
are made. Environmental roles are defined using a prolog-like logical
language for expressing policies. Cuppens and Cuppens-Boulahia [8]
propose an Organization Based Access Control. They introduce a con-
text algebra whereas we rely on Semantic Web languages. Moreover,
we deal with a wider range of contextual dimensions. Corradi et al. [5]
present UbiCOSM, a security middleware adopting context for policy
specification and enforcement. We support additional contextual di-
mensions, e.g., the device. Although their policies are expressed in
RDF, the system is not designed for the Web of Data.
4 http://www.w3.org/wiki/WebAccessControl
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Figure 1: The SHI3LD model at a glance (red boxes represent core classes).
3 The Model
The SHI3LD model is grounded on two ontologies (Figure 1): S4AC
deals with core access control concepts and PRISSMA5 focuses on
the mobile context6. The access control model is built over the notion
of Named Graph [3], thus supporting fine-grained access control
policies, including the triple level. Enforcing permission models is
an envisioned use case for RDF named graphs7. We rely on named
graphs to avoid depending on documents (one document can serialize
several named graphs, one named graph can be split over several
documents, and not all graphs come from documents8). At conceptual
level, our policies can be considered as access control conditions over
g-boxes9 (according to W3C RDF graph terminology), with semantics
mirrored in the SPARQL language. The S4AC vocabulary [19] reuses
concepts from SIOC, SKOS, WAC, SPIN and Dublin Core10.
The main component of the S4AC model is the Access Policy, as
presented in Definition 1. Roughly, an Access Policy defines the
constraints that must be satisfied to access a given named graph or a
set of named graphs. If the Access Policy is satisfied the data consumer
is allowed to access the data. Otherwise, the access is denied. The
constraints specified by the Access Policies may concern the data
consumer, the device, the environment, or any given combination of
these dimensions.
Definition 1. (Access Policy) An Access Policy (P ) is a tuple of
the form P = 〈ACS,AP, S,R,AEC〉 where (i) ACS is a set of
Access Conditions to satisfy, (ii) AP is an Access Privilege, (iii) S is
the subject of the set of resources to be protected by P , (iv) R is the
(set of) resource(s) to be protected by P , and (v) AEC is the Access
Evaluation Context of P .
5 Ontologies details at http://bit.ly/vspecs
6 SHI3LD can be adapted to support other definitions of context, stemming
from different scenarios.
7 http://bit.ly/w3rdfperm
8 The discussion about the use of named graphs in RDF 1.1 can be found at
http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf11-concepts
9 http://bit.ly/graphterm
10 Reused ontologies details at http://bit.ly/reusedv
An Access Condition, as defined in Definition 2, expresses a con-
straint which needs to be verified to have the Access Policy satisfied.
Definition 2. (Access Condition) An Access Condition (AC) is a
condition which tests whether or not a query pattern has a solution.
In the S4AC model, we express Access Conditions as SPARQL 1.1
ASK queries. Note that no query solution is returned, since SPARQL
ASK only tests whether a solution exists.
Definition 3. (Access Condition verification) If the query pattern has
a solution (i.e., the ASK query returns true), then the Access Condition
is said to be verified. If the query pattern has no solution (i.e., the
ASK query returns false), then the Access Condition is said not to be
verified.
Each Access Policy P is composed by a set of Access Conditions,
as defined in Definition 4.
Definition 4. (Access Condition Set) An Access Condi-
tion Set (ACS) is a set of access conditions of the form
ACS = {AC1, AC2, . . . , ACn}.
We introduce the ACS to ease the reuse and combination of ACs
to dataset administrators lacking deep SPARQL knowledge. We thus
avoid the use of more complicated SPARQL UNION clauses inside
the ASKs. Roughly, the verification of an Access Condition Set returns
a true/false answer and can be provided in a conjunctive or disjunctive
fashion.
Definition 5. (Conjunctive Access Condition Set) A
Conjunctive Access Condition Set (CACS) is a log-
ical conjunction of Access Conditions of the form
CACS = AC1 ∧AC2 ∧ . . . ∧ACn.
Definition 6. (Conjunctive ACS evaluation) A CACS is verified if
and only if every contained Access Condition is verified.
Definition 7. (Disjunctive Access Condition Set) A
Disjunctive Access Condition Set (DACS) is a log-
ical disjunction of Access Conditions of the form
DACS = AC1 ∨AC2 ∨ . . . ∨ACn.
Definition 8. (Disjunctive ACS evaluation) A DACS is verified if
and only if at least one of the contained Access Conditions is verified.
Conflicts among policies might occur if the data provider
uses Access Conditions with contrasting FILTER clauses. For in-
stance, it is possible to define positive and negative statements
such as ASK{FILTER(?u=<http://example#bob>)} and
ASK{FILTER(!(?u=<http://example#bob>))}. If these
two Access Conditions are applied to the same data, a logical conflict
arises. This issue is handled in the framework by evaluating poli-
cies applied to a resource in a disjunctive way. We expect to add a
mechanism to prevent the insertion of conflicting policies as future
work.
The Access Privilege (Definition 9) specifies the kind of operation
the data consumer is allowed to perform on the resource(s) protected
by the Access Policy.
Definition 9. (Access Privilege) An Access Privilege (AP ) is a
set of allowed operations on the protected resources of the form
AP = {Create,Read, Update,Delete}.
We model the Access Privileges as four classes of operations to
keep a close relationship with CRUD-oriented access control systems,
allowing a finer-grained access control beyond simple read/write
privileges. We relate the four privilege classes to SPARQL 1.1 query
and update language primitives through the SPIN ontology, which
models the SPARQL primitives as SPIN classes.
As previously explained, policies protect data at named graph level.
We offer two different ways of specifying the protected object: the
provider may target one or more specific named graphs, or a set
of named graphs associated to a common subject. The former is
achieved by providing the URI(s) of the named graph(s) to protect
using the s4ac:appliesTo property. The latter is implemented by
listing the subjects of the named graphs to protect using the property
dcterms:subject. The assumption here is that named graphs
have been previously annotated with such metadata. Summarizing,
both S and R represent the data to protect, but R specifies the URI(s)
of the named graphs, while S specifies the subject of the graphs
(e.g., the policy protects the named graphs whose subject is Concert,
http://dbpedia.org/resource/Concert11).
The Access Policy is associated to an Access Evaluation Context.
The latter provides an explicit link between the policy and the actual
context data (in the case of the mobile context it is modelled with
PRISSMA) that will be used to evaluate the Access Policy.
Definition 10. (Access Evaluation Context) An Access
Evaluation Context (AEC) is a list of predetermined
bound variables of the form AEC = (〈var1, val1〉,
〈var2, val2〉, . . . , 〈varn, valn〉).
In this paper, we focus on the mobile context, thus the Access
Evaluation Context list is composed only by a couple AEC =
(〈ctx, URIctx〉). We map therefore the variable ctx, used in the pol-
icy’s Access Conditions, to the URI identifying the actual mobile
context in which the SPARQL query has been performed (e.g. :ctx
in Figure 2b). More specifically, we choose to implement the Access
Evaluation Context as a SPARQL 1.1 BINDINGS clause to constrain
the ASK evaluation, i.e. BINDINGS ?ctx {(URIctx)}. However,
the same result can be obtained by binding directly the variable ?ctx
to the URI of the contextual graph.
The choice and the design of a context model necessarily need a
context definition first. We agree on the widely-accepted proposal by
Dey [9]:
11 dbpedia.org is the RDFized porting of Wikipedia.
:policy1 a s4ac:AccessPolicy; 
           s4ac:appliesTo :alice_data; 
           s4ac:hasAccessPrivilege [a s4ac:Update];
           s4ac:hasAccessConditionSet :acs1.
:acs1 a s4ac:AccessConditionSet; 
        s4ac:ConjunctiveAccessConditionSet;
        s4ac:hasAccessCondition :ac1,:ac2.
:ac1 a s4ac:AccessCondition; 
       s4ac:hasQueryAsk
       """ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
               ?context prissma:user ?u. 
               ?u foaf:knows ex:alice#me.}""".
:ac2 a s4ac:AccessCondition; 
       s4ac:hasQueryAsk
       """ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
               ?context prissma:environment ?env. 
               ?env prissma:based_near ?p. 
               FILTER (!(?p=ex:ACME_boss#me))}""".
ACCESS POLICY
RESOURCE TO PROTECT
ACCESS PRIVILEGE
ACCESS CONDITIONS
TO VERIFY
(a)
@prefix : <http://example/contextgraphs/bobCtx>
[other prefixes omitted]
<http://example/contextgraphs/bobCtx>{
:ctx a prissma:Context; 
        prissma:user :usr;
        prissma:device :dev; 
        prissma:environment :env.
:usr a prissma:User; 
        foaf:name "Bob";
        foaf:knows ex:alice#me.
:dev a prissma:Device; 
        hard:deviceHardware :devhw;
        soft:deviceSoftware :devsw. 
:devhw a hard:DeviceHardware;
          dcn:display hard:TactileDisplay. 
:devsw a soft:DeviceSoftware;
          soft:operatingSystem :devos. 
:devos a soft:OperatingSystem;
          common:name "Android".
:env a prissma:Environment; 
        prissma:motion "no";
        prissma:nearbyEntity :ACME_boss#me;
        prissma:currentPOI :ACMEoffice. 
:ACMEoffice a prissma:POI;
              prissma:poiCategory example:Office; 
              prissma:poiLabel example:ACMECorp.
}
THE CONSUMER'S
CONTEXT
THE USER DIMENSION
THE DEVICE DIMENSION
THE ENVIRONMENT 
DIMENSION 
(b)
Figure 2: The Access Policy protecting :alice data (a) and Bob’s
sample mobile context in TriG notation (b).
Definition 11. (Context) “Context is any information that can be
used to characterize the situation of an entity. An entity is a person,
place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction between
a user and an application, including the user and applications them-
selves” [9].
More specifically, we rely on the work by Fonseca and colleagues 12,
that we adopt as a foundation for our proposal. The mobile context is
seen as an encompassing term, an information space defined as the
sum of three different dimensions: the mobile User model, the Device
features and the Environment in which the action is performed.
Our Web of Data scenario favours the adoption of an ontology-based
model. As pointed out by Korpipa¨a¨ and Ma¨ntyja¨rvi [15], an ontologi-
cal approach leads to simple and extensible models. This is a common
point with the Web of Data rationale: Linked Data on the Web heavily
relies on lightweight vocabularies under the open world assumption
(i.e. new ontologies can be added at anytime about anything) and
12 http://bit.ly/XGR-mbui
model exchange and re-use are welcomed and promoted at Web scale.
A large number of ontology-based context models relying on Dey’s
definition have been proposed in the latter years, as summarized by
Bolchini et al. [2] (e.g. CoBrA, CoDaMoS, SOCAM). These works
are grounded on RDF and provide in-depth context expressivity, but
for chronological reasons they are far from the Web of Data best prac-
tices (e.g. no lightweight approach, limited interlinking with other
vocabularies), thus discouraging the adoption and re-use in the Web
community. Our work targets access control in the mobile Web of
Data: we need therefore a context model compliant with the Web
of Data paradigm [13]. Our context-aware access control framework
adopts PRISSMA, a lightweight vocabulary originally designed for
context-aware adaptation of RDF data [6]. PRISSMA has been orig-
inally designed to express the contextual conditions under which
activate a given representation for RDF [6]. In this paper we propose
context-based access policies, and we therefore need a vocabulary to
model mobile context. We thus re-use classes and properties of the
PRISSMA vocabulary for a different purpose, i.e. to represent contex-
tual conditions for accessing RDF graphs. PRISSMA provides classes
and properties to model core mobile context concepts, but is not meant
to deliver yet another mobile contextual model: instead, well-known
Web of Data vocabularies and recent W3C recommendations are
reused (Figure 1). Moreover, it does not provide a comprehensive,
exhaustive context representation: the approach is to delegate refine-
ments and extensions to domain specialists. The overall context is
modelled by the class prissma:Context and is determined by
the following dimensions:
Definition 12. (User Dimension) The User represents the mobile
requester associated to a Context and consists in a foaf:Person
sub-class. It can model both stereotypes and specific users.
Definition 13. (Device Dimension) TheDevice consists in a struc-
tured representation of the mobile device used to access the RDF
store.
The Device class inherits from W3C Delivery Context Ontol-
ogy 13 dcn:Device, providing an extensible and fine-grained model
for mobile device features and enabling device-specific access control.
Definition 14. (Environment Dimension) The Environment is the
model of the physical context in which the Web of Data resource
consumption takes place.
Different dimensions are involved in modelling the surrounding
environment. Location is modelled with the notion of Point of Interest
(POI). The POI class consists in a simplified, RDFized version of
the W3C Point of Interest Core specifications14. Time is modelled
extending the time:TemporalEntity class15. Other dimensions
are considered: the motion property associates any given high-level
representation of motion to a Environment. The proximity of an
object might determine access restrictions: nearby objects are asso-
ciated to the Environment with the nearbyEntity property. The
Activity class consists in a placemark aimed at connecting third-
party solutions focused on inferring high-level representations of user
actions (e.g.‘running’, ‘driving’, ‘shopping’, etc). Further refinements
and extensions are delegated to domain specialists (e.g. if dealing with
indoor location, the room vocabulary16 could be easily integrated).
13 http://bit.ly/dc-ontology
14 http://www.w3.org/TR/poi-core/
15 http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-time
16 http://vocab.deri.ie/rooms
Example 1. We now present an example of Access Policy with a
conjunctive Access Condition Set associated to an Update privilege
(Figure 2a). The policy protects the named graph :alice data and
allows the access and modification of the named graph only if the
consumer (i) knows Alice, and (ii) is not located near Alice’s boss.
Figure 2b visualizes a sample mobile context featuring all the dimen-
sions described above. The user, Bob, knows Alice and is currently at
work, near his and Alice’s boss. Bob is using an Android tablet with
touch display and he is not moving.
When dealing with mobile context, other issues need to be consid-
ered beyond context-model definition, such as context fetch, context
trustworthiness and privacy. The present paper assumes that context
data is fetched and pre-processed beforehand. PRISSMA supports
both raw context data fetched directly from mobile sensors (e.g. GPS
location, mobile features) and refined information processed on board
or by third-party, server-side services (e.g. POI resolution or user
activity detection). The trustworthiness of contextual information sent
by mobile consumers should not be taken for granted. The User’s
identity needs to be certified: this is an open research area in the
Web, and initiatives such as WebID17 specifically deal with this is-
sue. Hulsebosch et al. [14] provide a survey of context verification
techniques (e.g. heuristics relying on context history, collaborative
authenticity checks). A promising approach is mentioned in Kulkarni
and Tripathi [16], where context sensors are authenticated beforehand
by a trusted party. We plan to tackle the issue of context-verification
in future work. Privacy concerns arise while dealing with mobile
user context. We are aware that sensible data such as current location
must be handled with a privacy-preserving mechanism. In the present
proposition, we do not address this issue, nor the problem of context
integrity.
4 Access Control Enforcement
Our Access Control Manager is designed as a pluggable component
for SPARQL endpoints. The access control flow is described below
(Figure 3):
1. The mobile consumer queries the SPARQL endpoint to access the
content. Context data is sent with the query and cached as a named
graph using SPARQL 1.1 update language statements. Each time
a context element is added we use an INSERT DATA, while we
rely on a DELETE/INSERT when the contextual information is
already stored and has to be updated. Summarizing, the mobile
client sends two SPARQL queries: the first is the client query
to the datastore (e.g. Figure 5a), the second provides contextual
information (e.g. Figure 2b).
2. The client query is filtered by the Access Control Manager instead
of being directly executed on the SPARQL endpoint.
3. The Access Control Manager selects the set of policies affecting
the client query, i.e. those with a matching Access Privilege. This
is achieved by mapping the client query to one of the four Access
Privileges defined by S4AC with the SPIN vocabulary. The Ac-
cess Conditions (SPARQL ASK queries) included in the selected
policies are executed. According to the type of Access Condition
Set (i.e., conjunctive or disjunctive), for each verified policy, the
associated named graph is added to the set of accessible named
graphs.
4. The client query is sent to the SPARQL endpoint with the addition
of the following clauses:
17 http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/spec/
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Figure 3: The algorithm of access control enforcement in the SHI3LD architecture.
FROM/FROM NAMED clauses for SELECT queries, to execute
the query only on the accessible named graphs, given the contex-
tual information associated to the consumer. Adding the FROM
clause is not enough because, in case the client query includes a
GRAPH clause, we need to specify the set of named graphs to
be queried in a FROM NAMED clause, otherwise the query will
be executed on all the named graphs of the store;
USING/USING NAMED clauses for DELETE/INSERT,
DELETE and INSERT queries. The clauses describe a dataset
in the same way as FROM and FROM NAMED. The keyword
USING instead of FROM in update requests has been chosen
to avoid possible ambiguities which could arise from writing
DELETE FROM18.
Query execution is therefore performed only on the accessible
named graphs, given the consumer contextual information.
PREFIX bobCtx: <http://example/contextgraphs/bobCtx>
ASK{?context a prissma:Context. 
    ?context prissma:user ?u.
    ?u foaf:knows ex:alice#me.}
    BINDINGS ?context {(bobCtx:ctx)}
ASK {?context a prissma:Context. 
     ?context prissma:environment ?env. 
     ?env prissma:based_near ?p. 
     FILTER (!(?p=ex:ACME_boss#me))} 
     BINDINGS ?context {(bobCtx:ctx)}
THE CONSUMER'S
CONTEXT
Figure 4: The Access Conditions bound to the actual
prissma:Context shown in Figure 2
DELETE {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Concert_tours>. }
INSERT {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Music_performance>. }
WHERE {ex:article a bibo:Article}
(a)
DELETE {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Concert_tours>. }
INSERT {ex:article dcterms:subject 
        <http://dbpedia.org/page/Category: Music_performance>. }
USING :peter_data 
USING NAMED :peter_data
WHERE {ex:article a bibo:Article}
THE NAMED GRAPH ACCESSIBLE
BY THE CONSUMER
(b)
Figure 5: The SPARQL query issued by Bob’s mobile client (a) and
the filtered version (b).
18 http://bit.ly/deleteinsert
Example 2. An example of client query is shown in Figure 5a, where
Bob wants to access and modify the datastore (including Alice data
:alice data, protected by the policies in Figure 2a) in such a way
that all triples having dcterms:subject Concert tours are
changed into dcterms:subject Music performance. Bob
wants to perform such operation on the datastore from the context
described in Figure 2b. When the query is received by the Access
Control Manager, the latter selects the Access Policies concerning this
query (for instance the policy shown in Figure 2a). The Access Con-
ditions included in the policies are then coupled with a BINDINGS
clause, as shown in Figure 4, where the ?context variable is bound
to Bob’s actual context. The identification of the named graph(s) ac-
cessible by Bob returns, for example, only the graph :peter data.
Alice data is forbidden because Access Conditions evaluation leads to
a false answer with Bob’s context (Bob is near Alice’s boss). The
Access Control Manager adds the USING, USING NAMED clauses to
constrain the execution of the client query only on the allowed named
graph(s), i.e., :peter data. The filtered client query is shown in
Figure 5b.
5 Evaluation
To assess the impact on response time, we implemented the Access
Control Manager as a Java EE component and we plugged it to the
Corese-KGRAM RDF store and SPARQL 1.1 query engine19 [4]. We
evaluate the prototype on an Intel Xeon E5540, Quad Core 2.53 GHz
machine with 48GB of memory, using the Berlin SPARQL Bench-
mark (BSBM) dataset 3.120.
In Figure 6a we execute 10 independent runs of a test query
batch consisting in 50 identical queries of a simple SELECT over
bsbm:Review instances (tests are preceded by a warmup run). We
measure the response time with and without access control. When
executed against the Access Control Manager, the test SPARQL query
is associated to the mobile context described in Figure 2b. Each Ac-
cess Policy contains exactly one Access Condition. In Figure 6a, to
simulate a worst-case scenario, access is granted to all named graphs
defined in the base (i.e. all Access Conditions return true), so that
query execution does not benefit from cardinality reduction. Larger
datasets are less affected by the delay introduced by our prototype,
as datastore size plays a predominant role in query execution time
(e.g. for 4M triples and 100 always-true Access Policies we obtain
a 32.6% response time delay). Our solution is independent from the
complexity of the incoming SPARQL query, as the only change we do
is adding a list of FROM/FROM NAMED clauses (USING/USING
NAMED for updates). Since we do not need to rewrite the query, the
overhead is independent from query complexity.
In a typical scenario, the Access Control Manager restricts the results
19 http://tinyurl.com/corese-engine
20 http://bit.ly/berlin-sparql
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Figure 6: Response time overhead
of a query. In Figure 6b we assess the impact on performance for
various levels of cardinality reduction, using modified versions of the
BSBM dataset featuring a larger amount of named graphs (we define a
higher number of bsbm:RatingSites, thus obtaining more named
graphs). When access is granted to a small fraction of named graphs,
the query is executed faster than the case without access control (e.g.
if access is granted to only 1% of named graphs, the query is executed
19% faster on the 1M triple test dataset). As more named graphs and
triples are accessible, performance decreases. In particular, response
time is affected by the construction of the active graph, determined by
the merge of graphs in FROM clauses. As shown in Figure 6b, the cost
of this operation grows with the number of named graphs returned by
the evaluation of the Access Policies.
In Figure 6c we analyse the overhead introduced on response time by
queries executed in dynamic mobile environments. We execute inde-
pendent runs of 100 identical SELECT queries, dealing with a range
of context change probabilities. In case of a context update, the query
is coupled with a SPARQL 1.1 update (Section 4). Not surprisingly,
with higher chances of updating the context, the response time of the
query grows, since more SPARQL queries need to be executed. The
delay of INSERT DATA or DELETE/INSERT operations depends
on the size of the triple store and on the number of named graphs
(e.g. after a DELETE query, the adopted triple store refreshes inter-
nal structures to satisfy RDFS entailment). Performance is therefore
affected by the number of active mobile users, since each of them is
associated to a mobile context graph.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents an access control manager for RDF stores, de-
signed as a pluggable filter for generic SPARQL endpoints. Our so-
lution features context-aware control policies and relies only on Se-
mantic Web languages, thus we do not add ad-hoc policy definition
languages, parsers nor validation procedures. We protect triples by
(i) relying on named graphs and (ii) by changing the semantics of
incoming SPARQL queries, whose scope is restricted to triples in-
cluded in accessible named graphs only. We add support for mobile
context in control enforcement and we deliver fine-grained protection,
up to triple level. Prototype evaluation shows that when the access
is granted to a small fraction of named graphs, the query is executed
faster than the case without access control. The delay introduced
by our Access Control Manager grows with the number of Access
Conditions in the system but has less impact on larger datasets while
depending on the number of requesters. An effective backend user in-
terface to define Access Policies has to be designed as user interaction
issues should not be underestimated. Future work includes support-
ing the trustworthiness of context data sent by the mobile consumer
and a privacy-preserving mechanism to handle mobile user context
appropriately.
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